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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to determine the factors 
that contribute to electronic commerce fraud. We present 
a model that identifies five causes: the incentives of 
criminals, the characteristics of victims, the role of 
technology, the role of enforcement, and system related 
factors. The Internet has lowered the barriers to entry for 
criminal enterprises. Victims are unable to determine 
which sites are real and which ones are fraudulent and 
lack of reporting further facilitates this type of crime. The 
lack of enforcement, resulting from inadequate resources 
and laws, contributes to the lowering of entry barriers to 
fraudulent businesses. An analysis of FTC cases shows 
that most crimes are not technologically sophisticated and 
that greater awareness and experience with this type of 
schemes people will avoid being victimized. 
Introduction and problem statement 
This is an exploratory study that aims to identify the 
factors that lead to electronic commerce fraud. Criminal 
activity is a multifaceted phenomenon. A framework that 
integrates the motivating factors was developed. This 
study is composed of two parts. The first presents a model 
that is based on research that scholars have done in areas 
that are related to electronic commerce fraud. The second 
analyzes the suits filed by the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission to map out the crimes and gain a high level 
view of the type of crime that are committed on the 
Internet. 
This paper differs from previous contributions in that it 
is the first to explain the problem of electronic commerce 
fraud. Existing work on the subject has been primarily 
descriptive. A second contribution of this paper is that it 
presents a model that integrates all of the factors that 
others scholars have identified as causes of crime to 
explain incidents of fraud in electronic commerce 
transactions. Third, by using Federal Trade Commission 
cases filed against perpetrators, the paper presents a map 
of crimes based on technical and non-technical factors to 
determine the level of sophistication of these offenses. 
Electronic commerce has grown rapidly since the early 
1990s. According to a report by the Pew Internet and 
American Life Project, 65% of Internet users in the U.S. 
have bought products online 
[1]
. This number is likely to 
increase as more people become familiar with it and 
through broadband penetration. In the Christmas 2003 
holiday, for example, each of the top five product 
categories experienced double digit growth, with videos 
and DVDs showing a 46% increase from the previous 
year and apparel a 40% increase 
[2]
. 
Electronic commerce does not come without risks. The 
new medium has attracted people who engage in 
fraudulent activities. The Internet Fraud Complaint Center 
(IFCC) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
reports that Internet crime has been increasing since the 
agency began collecting this type of information. From 
2001 to 2002 fraud complaints tripled 
[3]
. Table 1 shows 
the number of IFCC reported cases of fraud by category 
and by average dollar amount loss. 
Table 1: Amount Lost by Fraud Type for 
Individuals Reporting Monetary Loss 
Type of fraud Percentage of 
complaints 
reporting dollar 
loss 
Average 
(median) dollar 
loss per typical 
complaint 
Auction Fraud 87 $320 
Non-delivery (mdse and 
payment) 
82 $176 
Credit/debit Card Fraud 62 $120 
Investment Fraud 75 $570 
Business Fraud 75 $220 
Confidence Fraud 58 $1,000 
Identity Theft 15 $2,000 
Check Fraud 56 $1,100 
Nigerian Letter Fraud <1 $3,864 
Communications Fraud 36 $174 
Source: IFFC, Internet Fraud Complaint Center, 
Washington, DC, 2003. 
 
In spite of the growing incidents of fraud on the 
Internet there is little scholarly work on the issue. Most of 
the papers written about the topic have focused on 
security related to unauthorized access of a company’s 
servers. Surprisingly, fraud related to transactions that 
have a presence on the Internet is “low tech.” Contrary to 
what one would expect, people who commit these crimes 
may not even have sophisticated computer skills. 
Similarly, while we would expect victims to be naïve or 
uneducated we find that all types of people have been 
victims of this type of crime. The purpose of this paper is 
thus to determine the factors that lead to electronic 
commerce fraud and provide some recommendations to 
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minimize it. The research questions that guide this study 
are: 
 
• What are the factors that lead to electronic commerce 
fraud? Why does it happen?  
• In what ways does ICT technology facilitate/inhibit 
the problem? 
• How do victims contribute to the problem? 
• How sophisticated are these crimes and the victims 
they target? 
 
The following sections present the model as well as the 
scholarly work that has preceded this research and forms 
the basis of the theoretical framework. 
Definitions 
Electronic commerce fraud is a relatively new 
phenomenon but it shares many of the features of 
traditional crime. Electronic commerce fraud falls at the 
intersection of several types of crime, as shown in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Antecedents of Electronic 
Commerce Crime 
 
Traditional
crime
White-collar
crime
Elderly
abuseComputer
crime
EC
crime
 
 
 
Like traditional crime, electronic commerce fraud 
results from a person engaging in an illegal activity that 
causes harm to someone else. The type of individual, as 
well as the type of illegal activity and the harm done 
determine which types of crimes take place.  
Electronic commerce fraud falls at the intersection of 
different types of crime. Some electronic commerce 
related crimes also listed in the common definitions of 
white-collar crime include false claims and statements as 
well as credit and lending institution fraud 
[4]
. Research in 
this area has recognized that white-collar crime is not the 
exclusive realm of top executives. There are corporations 
that set up questionable businesses, forming what Phillip 
Schrag has called the “commercial underworld”– “small 
and medium-sized firms that operate on the fringes of the 
law” 
[5]
. This is a type of business that normally preys on 
vulnerable people who, through pressure tactics and credit 
offers, pay for cheap merchandise and home repairs that 
are delivered unsatisfactorily if at all. High income 
individuals have also fallen prey to this type of scheme. A 
common example is to sell a luxury vacation property that 
does not exist 
[6]
. 
Electronic commerce can also be associated with 
elderly abuse. There are many people take advantage of 
vulnerable groups like the elderly, who often suffer from 
physical or mental impairments 
[7]
. To a certain extent the 
level of sophistication of computers has led many more 
people to become vulnerable in the same way that elderly 
people are. Technology is moving at a faster pace than 
society is able to learn and a savvy criminal can take 
advantage of people’s lack of understanding of these 
means to gain at their expense. 
Because electronic commerce fraud takes advantage of 
technology it is considered an Internet or computer crime. 
In the book Fighting Computer Crime, Donn Parker 
describes a crime committed by Mike Hansen, a computer 
scientist who helped develop a backup system for the wire 
transfer function of the Federal Reserve. While he worked 
on the project he interviewed several people and became 
knowledgeable about the system. He obtained the number 
of the interoffice settlement account and the telephone 
authorization code. One day he called the international 
banking department from a public phone. He wanted to 
make a $10.2 million dollar transfer. He provided a wrong 
account number, which the clerk corrected, giving him the 
correct one, enabling him to successfully transfer the 
money to Russalmaz, the Soviet government diamond 
brokerage house. He was later caught with the diamonds 
in his possession. As Parker describes, many people 
would not have considered this a computer crime as only 
a telephone was used. Parker nonetheless argues that this 
was a computer crime because the perpetrator accessed a 
computer terminal without authorization and used his 
computer skills, knowledge, and access to gain the 
necessary information 
[8]
. There are thus many electronic 
commerce crimes where the computer was not the 
instrument to commit the crime but, following Parker’s 
logic one could justify them as computer crimes as well.  
More recently the United States Department of Justice 
lists the following crimes: (1) use of a computer to 
facilitate a crime; (2) Internet gambling; (3) cyberstalking 
and harassing speech; (4) unlawful conduct on the 
Internet; (5) child pornography; and (6) sale of 
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prescription drugs over the Internet 
[9]
. Electronic 
commerce thus is unique as it does not fall into any of the 
categories described above. 
For the purpose of this study we define electronic 
commerce crime in a similar manner to the OECD 
[10]
: it 
consists of fraudulent and deceptive commercial practices 
that cause potential or actual harm to consumers by using 
or taking advantage of their vulnerabilities and of 
information technologies. These include 
misrepresentations of material fact, failing to deliver 
products or services that have been paid for, as well as 
charging or debiting consumer’s financial, telephone, or 
other accounts without authorization. 
Theoretical context: pieces of a model 
Because of the complexity and extent of criminal 
activity most studies in the area focus on a narrow aspect 
of the problem. This type of study has provided great 
insight into the minds of the criminals 
[11]
, the 
vulnerabilities of the victims 
[7]
, the weaknesses of law 
enforcement agencies 
[5]
, 
[12]
, 
[13]
, 
[14]
, and the role of 
instruments that helped to commit the crime
[11]
.  Given 
the narrow focus of these studies there is rarely an effort 
to present a systemic view of the problem even tough 
many of them have it implied. To our knowledge this is 
the first study that focuses on electronic commerce fraud. 
It differs from those contributions in that it benefits from 
prior work to develop a systemic view of the problem 
where each of the parts is considered to be part of the 
problem and, if correctly addressed, part of the solution as 
well.  
This study argues that individuals who engage in 
criminal activities regarding electronic transactions have 
made economic calculations that are similar to those of a 
businessperson. They have identified a profitable segment 
and potential customer base. Using the right technology 
and outlets they could generate promising income with 
little risk or adverse consequence. Taking this business 
model approach to electronic commerce crime, the next 
five sections present each of the pieces of the model. 
The model is composed of four major elements, the 
perpetrator, the victim, policing that can prevent fraud, 
and the means used to commit illegal acts. We believe that 
these four components with their associated factors are 
related to each other and combined from yet another 
factor that we call systemic feedbacks, which can be 
positive or negative. Figure 2 presents each of the four 
components with the associated factors. The following 
section will explain each of the components in more 
detail. 
Figure 2: Model of Systemic Effects of Electronic 
Commerce Fraud 
Policing
Criminal related
factors
Means used to
commit the crime
Victims related
factors
_
+
+
_
 
 
The development of the framework benefited from the 
use of triangulation as a methodology to help determine 
the factors leading to electronic commerce fraud. We 
relied on three types of sources. Scholarly work on the 
subject for traditional and online fraud to help us identify 
generally accepted factors leading to fraud. Aggregate 
statistics from the Internet Fraud Complaint Center and 
the National Consumers League were a third source of 
data. Federal Trade Commission court cases were a fourth 
source of data. These involved 301 lawsuits against 
people or companies that used the Internet to conduct 
illegal activities from 1994 to 2003. 
Each of the three researchers independently analyzed 
this data. Each developed a framework from the patterns 
that they were able to identify in the four sources of data. 
The final framework resulted from the combined analysis 
of the researchers. 
Criminal related factors 
A large body of research exists regarding criminals and 
the factors that lead them to engage in illegal activities. In 
this section we exclude street and violent crimes as the 
vast majority of electronic transaction related crimes are 
done without physical presence and are not violent in 
nature. The factors that lead these individuals to conduct 
criminal activities more closely resemble those of white-
collar crimes.  
In general academic work, scholars have identified four 
main contexts that can explain why people commit 
crimes: 1) biological; 2) psychological; 3) 
sociopsychological; and 4) sociological. Although these 
have been used to explain violent crime and street crime, 
some of these factors can also be applied to non-violent 
criminal activities. Sutherland, the first scholar to identify 
the problem of white-collar crime, argued that 
psychological factors do not cause this type of crime: 
“[t]he criminal behavior of businessmen cannot be 
explained by… feeblemindedness or emotional instability. 
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We have no reason to think that General Motors has an 
inferiority complex or that Aluminum Company of 
America has a frustration-aggression complex …” 
Sutherland nonetheless argues that personality factors 
cannot be entirely ruled out 
[15]
. A personality difference 
could lead someone to engage in criminal activities while 
another similarly place executive would reject them 
[5]
. 
In the book Crime and the Mind Bromberg concludes 
from analyzing several of his patients that the personality 
traits of white-collar crime are similar to those of a banker 
that was convicted of financial manipulation 
[16]
. They are 
realistic, relatively uncompromising, independent, and 
unaware of their strong tendency towards recklessness. 
On a deeper level they have a “certain rigidity of character 
expressed openly in stubbornness, independence and lack 
of compromise. Egocentricity and an unconscious feeling 
of omnipotence shown through [their] character 
structure.” [5]. 
Considering that most examples of electronic 
commerce crime are related to a business, however bogus, 
the individuals behind them have a clear profit motive. As 
was modeled by Deadman and Pyle 
[17]
 criminals, 
regardless of other drivers, weigh the forces of reward 
against risk. Moreover, people in general may juxtapose 
the rewards – the income obtained from carrying out the 
crime – they might see from a certain decision against the 
risks involved with enacting upon that decision – the costs 
of punishment if caught. The criminal expects to be 
rewarded for his actions, as is evident from the types of 
electronic commerce crime, such as false product sales, a 
phony web business, modem hijacking, and false 
promises. 
Because electronic commerce crimes have a 
technological component it is clear that individuals that 
that are engaged them it possess some level of technical 
understanding. Just as a pickpocket will have some degree 
of silence of foot and speed of hand, so will the cyber 
criminal have a degree of skill with computers and the 
Internet. The criminal’s ability may be in subterfuge, 
embedding meta-links in webpages so that searches will 
pull up unsolicited ads. The ability may come from 
experience with Ponzi schemes such that the criminal is 
aware of how to maximize profits while minimizing costs 
and thus, exploiting customers to the highest potential. A 
simpler level of ability would fall under incorporating 
spam emails as another channel to advertise a false 
product. Many companies who practiced this type of 
illegal business had other channels before using the 
Internet. However, the rapid acceptance of email into the 
mainstream has given these companies a large market of 
ready viewers. 
Victim related factors 
While there has been considerable research about 
criminals less is known about the victims. Studies of 
crime have generally focused on victims of violent crime 
and less is known about victims of economic transactions. 
The limited scholarly work that exists in this area is 
related to the difficulty of finding the victims. in many 
cases the victims of organizational crimes do not know 
that they have been victimized in the first place 
[5]
. They 
also do not know where to direct complaints when they 
discover a problem. In this respect Coleman writes: “ 
people who eat food with carcinogenic ingredients, buy 
short-weighted products, or breathe contaminated air 
seldom know with any degree of certainty that they have 
been the victims of a crime. Still, the regulatory agencies 
receive a large volume of complaints from business, 
special-interest groups, and the general public. The 
problem is that those complaints tend to be concentrated 
in few narrow areas where the harm is most obvious…” 
[5]. 
Although he was referring to white-collar crimes, the 
situation is similar for electronic transactions. There are 
many products of questionable quality that are sold on the 
Internet. For example the American Urological Clinic 
marketed Viagara-like products for $39.45. These 
included products under the names Alpostaglandin®, The 
Celldanaphil-pc System, Prosta-Gen®, Väegra®, and 
Urophil. They claimed that their products had been 
developed by legitimate medical enterprises and that they 
had a 68 to 94 percent chance of eliminating impotence 
[18]
. Similarly the American College For Advancement in 
Medicine promoted online its non-surgical EDTA 
“chelation therapy” which they claimed was effective in 
the treatment of atherosclerosis
[19]
. As can be appreciated 
from these examples, many of the products that were 
offered to consumers on the Internet take advantage of the 
inability of consumers to verify claims. Online 
transactions thus experience asymmetric information 
problems, where the seller possesses more information 
about the object to be exchanged than the buyer. As 
Nelson 
[20]
 explains, many products and services possess 
“experience” attributes that cannot be evaluated until after 
purchase when the person has had the opportunity of 
consuming them. This is particularly true when the price 
of a good is low enough, the personal cost of doing a 
quality inspection is not justified 
[20]
. 
In a traditional physical setting, as described by Ba and 
Pavlov, potential buyers have the opportunity of getting to 
know about the quality of a product by “kicking the tires” 
[21]
 but in an online setting where buyers never meet, this 
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is not a real possibility and buyers thus have to rely on 
written descriptions and in some cases digital photos of 
the items offered for sale 
[22]
. Under such circumstances 
sellers may be tempted to make inaccurate or incomplete 
descriptions of their online product offerings 
[21]
. 
Individuals that engage in these types of crimes are 
taking advantage of the asymmetries in information that 
exist in the sale of these products. They benefit from 
“practical anonymity,” where the customer knows that the 
company has a name and appears to be a legitimate 
business but in reality they are unaware of who they really 
are and the criminal nature of their business. This is 
further aggravated by additional deceiving practices that 
they include in the promotion of their products. For 
example they take advantage of legitimate products and 
associated them with their own illegitimate ones. 
SmartScience Laboratories, for example, sold via their 
website a product called JointFlex, a series of over the 
counter pain creams claimed to contain glocosamine and 
chonodroitin sulfate, two legitimate substances, which 
when applied topically provided more pain relief, but this 
was not true. 
The victims of electronic commerce fraud, contrary to 
what conventional wisdom would suggest, are not simply 
poor, uneducated, physically or mentally impaired 
individuals such as the elderly. The Internet and the trust 
that people put in websites has enabled some to easily 
deceive people at all levels of income and education. 
People’s vulnerabilities and concerns provide criminals 
with a large pool of potential “customers.” Some have 
taken advantage of people’s concern for the environment. 
The OneSource Worldwide Network sold on the Internet 
and elsewhere the EarthSmart Laundry CD for $80. The 
plastic disc that was sent to consumers was purportedly 
filled with “structured water” that cleaned as well as 
conventional detergents but with much lower 
environmental impact 
[23]
. 
They have taken advantage of people’s charitable 
inclinations. The Mentor Network, for example, set up a 
pyramid scheme where individuals paid $24 to join and 
another $30 a month thereafter for a minimum of one 
year. Of that amount they claimed that they sent $7.50 to a 
bona fide charitable organization that assists needy 
children in foreign countries while $15 was paid to 
consumers as recruitment bonuses and promised high 
monthly returns 
[24]
. 
They have taken advantage of people’s medical 
concerns by selling all types of products that claim to cure 
Alzheimer’s Disease, and HIV/AIDS 
[25]
. Others claimed 
to mitigated Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD)
[26]
, and chronic or degenerative diseases 
including multiple sclerosis, emphysema, tuberculosis and 
spinal cancer 
[27]
.  
Individual consumers are not the only ones vulnerable 
to the deceptive practices of companies that have 
established operations online. Small businesses are also 
vulnerable market niches for criminal entrepreneurs. They 
have set up operations that claim to offer additional 
revenues to small business clients by many products such 
as selling free-standing kiosks with accepting cash 
designed to allow customers to access the Internet for a 
fee. They have given phony references and made 
unreasonable earnings claims 
[28]
. One offered digital 
photo sticker vending machines which also claimed 
unreasonable revenue claims 
[29]
. 
There are also more sophisticated electronic commerce 
fraud schemes that use technology in a much more 
sophisticated manner. In the late 1990s, for example, a 
pornographic website offered its visitors additional free 
images if they downloaded a program. When executed the 
Audiotex Connection program silenced the speakers, 
disconnected the individual from their ISP and connected 
them to an international ISP that charged $2 per minute. 
As well, an Australian company, Internic Technology, 
developed a copy of the legal InterNIC site where it sold 
domain names for $250 instead of the $100 charged by 
InterNIC. They forwarded the application to Network 
Solutions and kept the difference 
[30]
. 
In the previous section it was stated that electronic 
commerce fraud resembled elderly abuse. The trust that 
many people put on Internet sites and the inability to 
determine if a product is working has made detection 
more difficult. Even with full mental abilities, basic 
human weaknesses have made common individuals and 
small companies vulnerable to the criminal creations of 
others. 
To add to the complexity and lack of understanding of 
the problem many of these crimes are unreported. 
According to Shover: “[a] great deal of white-collar crime 
goes unreported for the simple season that many of its 
victims are unaware they have been victimized. Unlike 
robbery, burglary, and other street crimes, acts of white-
collar crime frequently do not stand out in victims’ 
experiences; they characteristically have the look of 
routine legitimate transactions”
[4]
. Aside from the 
difficulty of recognizing that they have been victims of 
crime they also fail to report because they share part of the 
responsibility, believing that “they should have been more 
careful in the first place, victims often feel a sense of 
embarrassment and shame, and prefer that others not learn 
what happened to them” 
[4]
. By understanding this type of 
crimes and being aware of the capabilities of technologies 
people can begin to recognize and report these crimes.  
Policing factors as a deterrent to electronic 
commerce crimes 
Criminals are influenced by a number of factors 
including reward and risk. Many people juxtapose the 
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rewards they might see from a certain decision against the 
risks involved with acting upon that decision. The 
electronic commerce crimes identified here are clearly 
subject to this type of calculation. With each crime, 
whether it is a false product sale, a phony web business, 
modem hijacking, or a other false promise, there are 
certain rewards that the criminal can expect to gain from 
participating in the crime. There is also a risk of being 
caught.  
The law determines whether an activity is illegal or not. 
White-collar criminals consider law and enforcement is 
determining the probability of being caught. People 
weighing whether or not to engage in an illegal activity 
are likely to have a high probability of being successful. 
There are several factors that play in their favor. 
First, electronic commerce fraud often falls in grey 
areas of the law. For example, the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration does not regulate herbal or natural 
products, even when they make unsubstantiated health 
claims. It is thus impossible for people to determine the 
validity of those claims and it is sometimes debatable 
whether the company is committing a crime because they 
face no regulatory oversight. 
Second, resources to fight these types of crimes are 
more limited than those allocated for street and violent 
crimes. This is because the organizations in charge of 
enforcement, in the case of electronic commerce it is the 
Federal Trade Commission, are often regarded as being 
too bureaucratic and members of Congress consider self-
regulation as the first course of action 
[5]
. Most federal 
agencies can only enforce rules through civil or 
administrative actions. They can initiate a hearing before 
an administrative law judge or file a lawsuit in a civil 
court. If they determine that the case warrants criminal 
prosecution they can recommend this to the Justice 
Department, which then makes the final decision 
[5]
. 
Third, the penalties, which can be effective in deterring 
economic crime, are often lenient. Of the electronic 
commerce related cases that the Federal Trade 
Commission has filed before civil courts and 
administrative hearings, the vast majority of sanctions 
involve consumer redress, which entails the return of the 
funds that were acquired illegitimately. This is generally 
done by freezing the assets of the offenders. Other 
sanctions include prohibiting defendants from engaging in 
this type of illegal activity. In many instances, the case is 
settled and rarely does anybody face imprisonment.  
Another agency, the Federal Drug Administration, is 
limited in its enforcement powers. For example, it cannot 
forbid the distribution of a drug just because it has 
hazardous side effects as there are many drugs that are 
effective in the treatment of serious diseases that have 
serious side effects. Similarly the FDA does not test drugs 
coming to market. The companies that develop and 
manufacture the products instead do these. The Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, which is in charge of issuing 
regulations with the intention of protecting customers 
from unsafe products, is unable to prevent the sale of 
dangerous products, the normal course of action is to 
intervene after injuries or deaths have already occurred 
[5]
. 
Fourth, government agencies have their budgets 
approved by Congress, and thus want to be seen as doing 
their job. The pressure to perform combined with limited 
resources often causes them to have to decide between 
persecuting important but time-consuming cases that 
could potentially alienate powerful corporate interests or 
pursuing less important claims that will more easily result 
in a list of convictions that will impress congressional 
oversight committees 
[5]
. 
Fifth, the government has generally ignored white-
collar crimes in favor of more visible street and violent 
crimes. Crime control has been at the center of partisan 
politics because voters seem to care deeply about this 
issue. As Tonry argues “ Critics claim that Republicans 
and other conservatives cynically heightened public 
anxieties about crime by stressing it relentlessly in 
campaigns and legislative chambers and then promised to 
assuage those anxieties by promoting harsh penalties. 
There is considerable evidence to support this claim. 
Heightened political and media attention to crime and 
drugs issues nearly always precedes increases in the 
percentages of Americans who name crime or drug abuse 
as “America’s most pressing problem” 
[31]
. 
The problems that agencies face make electronic 
commerce fraud fall in the outer limits of the law made 
which prompted Kedrosky to make an analogy “between 
cyberspace and the 19th century frontier “boom town” 
where there is little law and unrestrained capitalism reigns 
supreme”
[32]
. Because of the low probability of being 
caught and then relatively mild punishment that these 
individuals face, there are great incentives for people to 
engage in this type of business. 
Means related factors 
Many of the crimes that are committed using the 
Internet as a tool could have as easily been done through 
the phone or mass media outlets. Many of the pyramid 
schemes and false product offerings that are appearing on 
the Internet have existed in other media for many years. 
Ponzi schemes that are becoming so common on the 
Internet have existed for decades
[33]
. There are several 
factors that contribute to the proliferation of these illegal 
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businesses. Many of them are related to the inherent 
characteristics of the Internet. 
First it is an international network where an increasing 
number of people are connected. In the United States 
where most of the crimes identified by the FTC occur, 128 
million people, 64% of the population, have Internet 
access 
[34]
. Compared to traditional media outlets a 
criminal can access a wider portion of the population at a 
much reduced price. Even though national television 
broadcasting reaches a larger segment of the population, 
these “interactions” correspond to short one-way 
segments that are available at a relatively high price. 
Other media outlets are much more fragmented and most 
target local areas. The Internet, in contrast, has a constant 
presence at a fraction of the cost. The potential audience is 
larger than that of a city. There is also access to an 
audience outside of the United States.  
Anonymity and practical anonymity are other factors 
that contribute to people being defrauded. A growing 
number of people are relying on the Internet for 
information. While people are aware that not all the 
information provided on the Internet is accurate, it is not 
easy to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate sources. 
Hittle points out that “[i]ronically, anonymous messages 
on the Internet are not always false. A study presented at 
the 1998 Summer Symposium on Accounting Research 
suggested that anonymous forecasts appearing on the 
Internet were better predictors of the performance of 
technology companies than were the traditional analysts' 
forecasts appearing in the electronic First Call Network” 
[35]
. Without the public being able to discern between 
truthful or deceiving information, many fall prey to the 
skills of criminals. It is not surprising that these types of 
crimes are often called crimes of trust.  
In addition to real anonymity there is also something 
that we call practical anonymity. This refers to the 
existence of sites that identify themselves with names and 
may even provide an address. Even though they provide 
this information it is not possible to determine if that 
company or organization is legitimate. In the physical 
world one can visit the location of the business while on 
the Internet finding out whether or not a company is real 
will require research that most people do not do. Such 
research is often not worth the effort when the price of a 
good is low enough than the personal cost of a quality 
inspection exceeds it 
[20]
. 
Software to develop webpages is becoming 
increasingly easy to use. People can make sophisticated 
and professional looking webpages, which is facilitated by 
the ease with which one can obtain an exact copy an entire 
webpage by simply copying the code 
[35]
. 
Grazioli and Jarvenpaa created several fake webpages 
as part of a study. Students were not able to distinguish 
between legitimate and fake ones. Only eight of the 80 
participants in the study successfully identified a 
fraudulent site
[36]
. An individual unaware of the types of 
scams that have been developed on the Internet may not 
question the validity of a site with a professional look and 
confidently make a transaction.  
The lack of face to face contact is another factor that 
allows criminals to more easily lull users into believing 
suspect claims. The creation of virtual communities, and 
the corresponding decrease in the level of participation in 
real world communities, may decrease the propensity to 
question the plausibility of claims and schemes. Among 
perpetrators of fraud, there appears to be a reduction in 
impediments to such acts. The ability to deal on a faceless 
basis, at the click of button, with individuals throughout 
the world, may facilitate misleading and deceitful acts. 
This may be the apotheosis of advanced capitalism, where 
commodities are exchanged in cyberspace, often for the 
mere purpose of exchange or sometimes for nothing at all 
[37]
. 
Systemic factors 
Each of the four factors described above contribute to 
electronic commerce fraud on their own, but the 
combination of all of them further increases the 
probability of an individual engaging in these types of 
activities without many risks. The Internet has 
substantially reduced barriers to entry for criminals. 
Inherent features of the network, such as anonymity and 
low costs, make it easy for individuals to defraud others 
with little effort. Criminals can set up phony websites as 
well as send thousands of e-mails that market bogus 
products and services. While the international nature of 
the network has facilitated entry, the resources for 
enforcement have reduced as well. The size of the 
network as well as lack of resources and effective 
regulatory tools makes it difficult to prosecute cases. Even 
in those circumstances where criminals have been found 
and a case against them has been filed, the penalties and 
sanctions are often limited to confiscation of what the 
illegally obtained. This is not enough to create an 
effective deterrent. An analysis of the cases that the FTC 
has prosecuted shows that the same types of crime are 
repeated over and over again. There are perhaps a few 
differences in execution but the basics are same. This 
indicates that criminals have found profitable enterprises 
and are able to reestablish businesses that take advantage 
of the returns that come with lax enforcement, easy to use 
technology, and naïve consumers that believe messages 
that are professional in appearance. The victims 
themselves become another factor in the system that 
contributes to the incentives to set up this type of 
operation. The victims’ own weaknesses, desperation, and 
inability to verify the information further lowers barriers 
for the criminal. 
In the framework shown in Figure 2, there are two 
arrows that come from the victim. One connects to the 
enforcement box and the other to the means box. If the 
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victim reports the crime then it can enhance the policing 
effort and potentially reduce the amount of fraud 
committed. If the victim does not report the crime then 
this weakness on the part of the victim becomes another 
means/tool that the criminal takes advantage of in 
committing the crime. 
Analysis of crimes 
The previous section presented a framework that 
identified the causes that contribute to the development of 
fraudulent business enterprises. The model helped to 
answer three of the four research questions established at 
the beginning of this project. The last question 
nonetheless remains to be answered. While the model was 
able to explain the factors that contribute to electronic 
commerce fraud it is necessary to determine the level of 
sophistications of these crimes and the technical and non-
technical tools that are used in these activities.  
At a conference on cybercrime that took place at the 
Yale Law School in March 2004, we conducted informal 
interviews to determine if there was data that could be 
analyzed for this study. Talks with individuals from 
Interpol, government officials from other countries in 
charge of cyber crime, and scholars that specialized in the 
subject commented that there is little data on Internet 
fraud. The reason they provided for this is because it is 
difficult to detect and it is commonly not reported [38].  
Given the lack of data, the analysis in this section is 
based on the list of cases that the Federal Trade 
Commission has filed before administrative and civil 
courts from 1994 to 2003. These correspond to 301 cases, 
of which a sample of 75 was selected at random for 
analysis. The number of cases corresponds to a 10 
confidence interval at a 95% confidence level. Each of the 
cases was scored based on the categories in Table 2. 
Once the cases were scored based on this criteria a 
series of ratios were created to map the cases based on the 
technical and non-technical features of the crime.  
The technical ability of the criminal versus the 
technical savvy of the victim scores were combined to 
create the first ratio. These two components are in 
opposition. For every step that the criminal can take to 
become more enabled, the victim can take a step to 
become less of a victim. By creating a ratio, and placing 
the Technical Ability of the Criminal (A) over the 
Technical Savvy of the Victim (S), the first electronic 
commerce fraud ratio (A/S) is created. 
Of the two non-technical scores the first corresponds 
with the expected reward versus the perceived risk to the 
criminal. Because these two components are at odds in the 
cyber criminal’s decision-making, they are placed 
together to form the second force ratio. Expected Reward 
to the Criminal (Re) is placed over Perceived Risk to the 
Criminal (Ri) and thus we have (Re/Ri) 
The final electronic commerce fraud force ratio is the 
Victim’s Desire for the product or service (D) placed over 
the Cost (C) that the victim must pay in order to satisfy 
that need. Thus, the ratio is (D/C). Of all the ratios that 
were created, the last two pairs are clearly non-technical, 
while the first pair is clearly technical. In order to graph 
the technical scores against the non-technical, we take the 
average of the last two force pairs, thus producing the 
following: 
 
Technical Coordinate = (A / S) 
Non-technical Coordinate = ((Re / Ri) + (D / C)) / 2 
 
By running this calculation on each score, it is possible 
to present the results in a graph that provides a new way 
of looking at electronic commerce fraud. 73 cases were 
scored using the method described above and have are 
plotted in Figure 3 to provide a graphical representation of 
the sample of electronic commerce crimes. Please note 
that the technical component is on the x-axis and the non-
technical component is on the y-axis 
Figure 3: Categorization of Federal Trade 
Commission Cases 
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Several of the cases cluster around the coordinate (1.00, 
1.00). This point is important because it represents a 
balance between each measure. For example, a result of 
1.00 in the technical ratio shows that the criminal used a 
technological method that was not highly sophisticated 
and the victims could have detected it if they had been 
more experienced. The criminal might have created a 
convincing webpage that caused people to send money to 
a false charity. This is a relatively simple demonstration 
of technical ability on the part of the criminal, and 
involves little savvy on the part of the victim. Thus, both 
parties showed the same level of technical skill.  
The same can be seen on the non-technical side. A 
criminal may believe that he can obtain considerable 
 I
II
 III 
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revenues through a particular type of fraud. He must then 
consider the risks. Looking at the graph, while still taking 
into account the ratios we averaged, it is possible to see 
that the risks did not substantially outweigh the rewards. 
On the other side of the average, we also see that the level 
of desire that victims felt was often close to that of the 
costs.  
Scores at the coordinate (1.00, 1.00) can be considered 
balanced. In concrete terms, we can say that these are 
crimes where criminals did not greatly outsmart victims, 
rewards were not greatly out of line from risks, and 
victims were not coerced into costly deals without 
substantial desire on their part.  
For the next area that we consider, we move out (0.80 , 
0.80) from the central point. This gives us a region from 
0.20 to 1.80, the sector I area in Figure 3. We selected this 
area because it provided a natural break for the data. It is 
in this region that we find the majority of the crimes and 
thus the most common infractions. It should be pointed 
out here that, because we scored on a scale of 1 to 5, there 
will be no points in the region between 0 and .20. 
Within the region of 0.20 through 1.80, we see many 
different types of crimes. Many of the crimes in this area 
are not far from balanced. The criminal may have enticed 
the victim with a pyramid scheme that cost only hundreds 
of dollars and promised thousands, or used a fancy 
website to persuade the victim to submit private 
information. This first level of imbalance demonstrates 
that the majority of electronic commerce crimes are 
relatively simple. Criminals do not often show a great deal 
of technical abilities in the effort of outsmarting victims, 
nor do they often take substantial risks without 
commensurate reward. The crimes in this sector are thus 
not very sophisticated but the criminals have taken some 
time to make their operation look professional or 
legitimate. Victims in the crimes represented in this sector 
do not seem to be technologically savvy and are likely to 
fall prey to these schemes. 
The second region that we will consider is (?.16, ?.16) 
from the central point, and excludes the previous regions. 
This is the sector II band in Figure 3. This is once again a 
natural break for the data. Here we see crimes where the 
balance is further away from normal. An example would 
be an adult site that collects visitor information and then 
bills that victim without their knowledge or approval. 
Here, we see a simple degree of technical ability – the 
criminal made a website that collects client information 
using cookies stored on the victim’s machine. The victim 
is not aware of the crime, and thus could not have 
prevented it at the time. Crimes in this area involve a 
criminal that has more knowledge of the technology than 
the victim. The use of technology nonetheless does not 
mean that they are able to more easily deceive an 
unsuspecting online customer. In fact the use of the 
technology itself led to easier detection after the crime had 
been committed. The reward of billing victims without 
their knowledge may be great, but the risk is greater. This 
is because the victims could see the unsolicited charges on 
their credit and debit card statements and take action. Due 
to this greater imbalance between the forces, it is difficult 
though not impossible to succeed with crimes in this band.  
The final region encompasses the rest of the graph and 
corresponds to sector III in Figure 3. Crimes in this area 
are extremely difficult to execute. They may involve a 
known company, thus sparking the highest level of trust 
from victim. Such a crime is extremely rare, as few 
mainstream companies will engage in obvious criminal 
activity. Another example of a red band crime is a chain 
letter scheme where victims sent $50 due to a promise that 
they would receive $50,000 within three months. Such a 
crime can be extremely difficult to achieve because it can 
be difficult to convince victims of such ridiculous claims. 
Red band crimes are the farthest out of balance and thus, 
for the criminal, can be both the most dangerous and the 
most profitable. These crimes can also be more harmful to 
victims and cause them to lose faith in electronic 
commerce. 
It is thus not surprising that most instances of electronic 
commerce fraud are more subtle and require little 
technical sophistication on the part of the criminals. 
Conclusion 
This paper determined the causes of electronic 
commerce fraud. We created a model from the scholarly 
work that preceded this study that identifies five causes of 
fraud. One of these is a systemic cause that could either 
aggravate or alleviate the problem. It is clear that the 
Internet has lowered the barriers to entry for criminal 
enterprises. At the same time it has provided new tools 
and the victims are often not able to determine which sites 
are real and which are fraudulent. Criminals prey on 
desires and vulnerabilities. The lack of enforcement due to 
limitations of law and resources as well as lack of 
reporting, contributes to the lowering of barriers for 
criminals to enter this type of business. The analysis of 
cases shows that, for the most part, these crimes are not 
technologically sophisticated. 
Greater technological sophistication leaves a traceable 
mark. Similarly, the crimes with the greatest profit 
potential are also difficult to execute because the claims or 
the tools to deceive are also extreme and not easily 
believable. This paper supports the view that people are 
often unable to determine whether a site or an e-mail is 
legitimate. Governments can potentially help to reduce the 
instances of E-commerce fraud by raising awareness and 
encouraging people to report suspicious types of business. 
Because of the difficulty that people have in identifying 
these fraudulent sites a web page listing the common 
characteristics of these schemes with examples can help 
people avoid falling prey to these fraudulent 
organizations. Greater enforcement should also contribute 
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to increase the costs of the crime and thus minimize this 
type of activity. 
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Table 2: Coding System 
Technical Factors 
 (Technical) Ability of the Criminal (Technical) Savvy of the Victim 
1 Used an email Unable to resist an unsophisticated method 
2 Used a website Unable to resist a convincing email or webpage (not a hijacked webpage) or other 
demonstration of simple web ability 
3 Demonstrated strong use of the web (e.g. complex 
website, site spoofing) 
Unable to resist a hijacked webpage or spoofed email address or other 
demonstration of strong web ability 
4 Hijacked software (web pages) or created minor 
applications 
Unable to resist a hidden, but not invisible act of control or misrepresentation 
5 Hijacked hardware or created extensive applications Unable to resist an invisible web tag, embedded subroutine, or other shadowy 
Subterfuge 
Non Technical Factors for the Criminal 
 (Non-Technical) Reward to the Criminal 
 
(Non-Technical) Risk to the Criminal  
   
1 Intangible reward (e.g. pride, bragging rights) Safe 
 
2 Thousands of dollars Not very obvious crime 
3 Three to tens of thousands of dollars Mild misrepresentation of products, services, privacy policy, charges, rewards or 
identities 
4 Hundreds of thousands of dollars Gross misrepresentation or products, services, privacy policy, charges, rewards 
and/or identities 
5 Millions of dollars or more Extremely transparent - the lie will be discovered quickly (e.g. non-delivery) 
Non Technical Factors for the Victim 
 (Non-Technical) Cost to the Victim (Non-Technical) Desire of the Victim 
1 $0-$9 No desire for product 
2 $10-$99 Little desire – just trying it out 
3 $100-$499 Could benefit from money, service or product 
4 $500-$4999 and/or repeated cost of up to $99 Strong feeling of need for money, service or product 
5 Over $5000 and/or repeated cost of up to $499 Desperately believe they need the money, service or product 
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